The Ockham Society

Abstract: In the Republic 3, Socrates allows for certain poetry that uses imitation—namely, poetry that imitates good people when they act faultlessly and intelligently, and poetry that imitates bad people briefly when they do something good or when it is only “for play” (396c-e). However, as he opens Book 10, he claims that he is satisfied that he “didn’t admit any [poetry] that is imitative” when founding the city (595a-b). He then proceeds to justify a blanket ban on such poetry with his theories of the soul and forms, without ever explaining whether this blanket ban conflicts with Book 3. 

This essay aims to offer a new reading of the opening claim of Book 10 to resolve the conflict. I argue that we must distinguish imitating (μιμέομαι) and imitation (μίμησις) from being imitative (μιμητικός): the former two refer to the act of imitating and its product, respectively; the last one refers to a type of person whose nature is to pursue imitation as an end in itself and who is proficient at imitating whatever pleases the audience. It is not imitation as such that is excluded, but imitativeness, for imitative poetry directly threatens Kallipolis’s orderly functioning. 

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Ockham Society Convenors: Max Festenstein, Leo Sonntag, Marta Szatkowska, and Joseph Karaganis | Ockham Society Webpage