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Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra
College Oriel College
Area of Specialisation Early Modern Philosophy Metaphysics
Membership Postholders
Professor of Metaphysics
Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, Oriel College
gonzalo.rodriguez-pereyra@oriel.ox.ac.uk

See page on college website
 2007 - present Professor of Metaphysics, CUF Lecturer, Tutorial Fellow of Oriel College
2005 - 2007 Professor of Philosophy. University of Nottingham
  Profesor Plenario. UTDT, Argentina
2001 - 2005 CUF Lecturer, Gilbert Ryle Fellow in Philosophy, Hertford College, Oxford
2000 - 2001 Lecturer. University of Edinburgh
1998 - 2000 JRF Churchill College, University of Cambridge
1998 PhD (Philosophy) University of Cambridge
1995 MPhil (Philosophy) University of Cambridge
1991 Licenciado en Filosofia, Universidad Nacional de Cordoba, Argentina

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra has written on the following topics: 

  1. 'Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism', forthcoming in the Routledge Handbook of Properties, edited by Anna-Sofia Maurin and Anthony Fisher.
  2. Nominalism about Properties: New Essays. Co-edited with Ghislain Guigon. Routledge. 2015.
  3. ‘Resemblance Nominalism and abstract nouns', Analysis, 75 (2), April 2015, pp. 223-231.
  4. 'Resemblance Nominalism, Conjunctions and Truthmakers', forthcoming in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, issue No. 1, Volume CXIII (2012).
  5. Resemblance Nominalism. A Solution to the Problem of Universals, Oxford University Press, 2002.
  6. Response to Zimmerman. Times Literary Supplement (9/07/2004)
  7. 'Nominalism in Metaphysics'. 2008. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  8. 'Los hacedores de verdad y el nominalismo de semejanzas: una solución al problema de los universales'. (Entrevista. Entrevistadores Julián Trujillo y Carlos Muñoz). El Hombre y la Máquina, 27, Julio-Diciembre 2006. 
  9. 'Paradigms and Russell's Resemblance Regress'. 2004. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82 (4), pp. 644-51. 
  10. 'Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts: reply to Bird'. 2003. Analysis 63 (3), pp. 229-37. 
  11. 'Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress'. 2001. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79 (3), pp. 395-408. 
  12. 'Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community'. 1999. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 59 (4), pp. 965-982.
  13. 'Sobre una versión del Nominalismo de Semejanzas'. 1996. Revista de Filosofía (Buenos Aires), 11 (1/2), pp. 35-41.

  1. 'Indiscernible Universals', Inquiry, DOI 10.1080/0020174X2016.1210541; published online: July 2016.
  2. Resemblance Nominalism. A Solution to the Problem of Universals, Oxford University Press, 2002.
  3. 'Particulares y Universales'. 2003. In Gonzalez, J. and Trias, E. (eds.), Enciclopedia Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Cuestiones Metafísicas, pp. 225-46. 
  4. 'The Problem of Universals and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis'. 2002. Philosophical Papers, 31 (1), March 2002, pp. 39-47.
  5. 'What is the Problem of Universals?'. 2000. Mind, 109 (434), pp. 255-273.

  1. 'Two Arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles', Oxford University Press, 2022
  2. ‘Bolzano's argument for the Identity of indiscernibles', in preparation – draft.
  3. 'The argument from almost indiscernibles', Philosophical Studies, DOI: 10.1007/s11098-016-0843-8; published online: December 2016.
  4. 'Indiscernible Universals', Inquiry, DOI 10.1080/0020174X2016.1210541; published online: July 2016.
  5. 'How not to trivialise the identity of indiscernibles'. 2006. In P. F. Strawson and A. Chakrabarti (eds.) Concepts, Properties and Qualities, Ashgate, 2006, pp. 205-223.
  6. 'The Bundle Theory is compatible with distinct but indiscernible particulars'. 2004.Analysis, 64 (1), pp. 72-81. Romanian translation ('Teoria legaturilor este compatibilita cu particularele indiscernabile distincte') in Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations, 4, pp. 199-209, 2005. 
  7. 'Leibniz's argument for the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles in Primary Truths'. 2004. In M. Carrara, A. M. Nunziante, and G. Tomasi, (eds.) Individuals, minds and bodies: themes from Leibniz. Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa (32), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, pp. 49-59. 
  8. 'Leibniz's Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in his Correspondence with Clarke'. 1999. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77 (4), pp. 429-438. (Abstract requested by and published in The Review of Metaphysics, December 1999)

  1. ‘Why is there something rather than nothing? A probabilistic answer examined', Philosophy, 93 (4), 2018, pp. 505-21.
  2. 'The Subtraction Arguments for Metaphysical Nihilism: compared and defended', in Tyron Goldschmidt (ed.), 2013, The Puzzle of Existence: Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing, Routledge.
  3. 'Modal Realism and Metaphysical Nihilism'. 2004. Mind, 113 (452), pp. 683-704.
  4. 'Metaphysical Nihilism defended: reply to Lowe and Paseau'. 2002. Analysis, 62 (2), pp. 172-80. 
  5. 'Lowe's Argument against Nihilism'. 2000. Analysis, 60 (4), pp. 335-340. 
  6. 'There might be Nothing: the Subtraction Argument Improved'. 1997. Analysis, 57 (3), pp. 159-166.

  1. 'A defense of explanation-first truthmaking: some thoughts on Jamin Asay's A Theory of Truthmaking', Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2022.
  2. ‘Grounding is not a strict order', Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3), 2015, pp. 517-534.
  3. ‘Truthmaker Maximalism defended again' (with Eduardo Barrio), Analysis Vol, 75 (1), January 2015, pp. 3–8.
  4. Review of T. Merricks, Truth and Ontology, 2011. Mind 120 (478), pp. 542-552
  5. 'The Disjunction and Conjunction Theses'. 2009. Mind, 118 (470), pp. 427-443
  6. 'Postscript to "Why Truthmakers"'. 2008. In E. J. Lowe and A. Rami (eds) Truth and Truth-Making, Stockfield: Acumen, 2008, pp. 242-50.
  7. 'Truthmaking, entailment, and the conjunction thesis'. 2006. Mind, 115 (460), pp. 957-982. 
  8. 'Truthmaker Maximalism Defended'. 2006. Analysis, 66 (3), pp. 260-64. 
  9. 'Truthmakers'. 2006. Philosophy Compass, 1 (2), pp. 186-200. 
  10. 'Why Truthmakers'. 2005. In H. Beebee and J. Dodd (eds) Truthmakers: the contemporary debate, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 17-31. Reprinted in E. J. Lowe and A. Rami (eds) Truth and Truth-Making, Stockfield: Acumen, 2009, pp. 227-41. Spanish translation ('Por qué hacedores de verdad') in Hurtado, G. and Nudler, O. (eds.) El Mobiliario del Mundo: Ensayos de Ontología y Metafísica, UNAM, Mexico, 2006. 
  11. 'Truthmaking and the Slingshot'. 2001. In U. Meixner (ed.), Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age, öbv&hpt Verlagsgesellschaft: Wien 2001, pp. 99-106. 
  12. Review of J. Dodd, An Identity Theory of Truth. 2001. Philosophical Books, 42 (4), pp. 296-7. 
  13. 'El Problema Metafísico de la Verdad'. 2000. Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía(Buenos Aires) 26 (2), pp.353-59. 
  14. 'Searle's Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Slingshot'. 1998. The Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (4), pp. 513-522.

  1. 'Slingshot arguments'. 2005. In E. Craig (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online. London: Routledge.
  2. Review of S. Neale, Facing Facts. 2003. Mind, 112 (448), pp. 780-86. 
  3. 'Truthmaking and the Slingshot'. 2001. In U. Meixner (ed.), Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age, öbv&hpt Verlagsgesellschaft: Wien 2001, pp. 99-106. 
  4. 'Searle's Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Slingshot'. 1998. The Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (4), pp. 513-522. 
  5. 'Mellor's Facts and Chances of Causation'. 1998. Analysis, 58 (3), pp. 175-181.

  1. 'What is wrong with the Relational Theory of Change?' 2003. InH. Lillehammer and G. Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics, Routledge, 2003, pp. 184-195.

Books

  1. Leibniz's Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, Oxford University Press, 2014.
  2. Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics. Translation, with introduction and commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.

Articles

  1. ‘Bolzano's argument for the Identity of indiscernibles', in preparation – draft.
  2. ‘Rousseau versus Voltaire on Optimism', forthcoming in Justin Daeley (ed.) Optimism and the best possible world: a philosophical history, Routledge.
  3. ‘Kant on the Existence and Uniqueness of the Best Possible World', Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, 2018, pp. 195-215.
  4. ‘The Principles of Contradiction, Sufficient Reason, and Identity of Indiscernibles', in Maria Rosa Antognazza (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Leibniz, Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 45-64.
  5. ‘Leibniz on substance in the Discourse on Metaphysics', in Tom Stoneham and Paul Lodge (eds.), Locke and Leibniz on substance, Routledge, 2015.
  6. 'The Principles of Contradiction, Sufficient Reason, and Identity of Indiscernibles'. Forthcoming. In Maria Rosa Antognazza (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Leibniz, Oxford University Press.
  7. 'Leibniz's argument for the identity of indiscernibles in his letter to Casati (with transcription and translation)', Leibniz Review, vol. 22, 2012, pp. 137-150.
  8. 'Infinite analysis, lucky proof, and guaranteed proof in Leibniz'. 2011. (co-written with Paul Lodge). Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 93, 2, pp. 222--36.
  9. 'Leibniz. Mind-body causation and pre-established harmony'. 2009. In R. Le Poidevin, P. Simons, A. McGonigal and R. Cameron (eds) Routledge Companion to Metaphysics 
  10. 'Descartes's substance dualism and his independence conception of substance'. 2008.Journal of the History of Philosophy, 46, 1, January 2008, pp. 69-89 (copyright held by the publisher of the Journal, the Johns Hopkins University Press) 
  11. 'Leibniz's argument for the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles in Primary Truths'. 2004. In M. Carrara, A. M. Nunziante, and G. Tomasi, (eds.) Individuals, minds and bodies: themes from Leibniz. Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa (32), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, pp. 49-59. 
  12. 'Leibniz's Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in his Correspondence with Clarke'. 1999. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77 (4), pp. 429-438. (Abstract requested by and published in The Review of Metaphysics, December 1999)
  13. Review of R. C. Sleigh Jr., Leibniz & Arnauld. A Commentary on their correspondence. 1995. Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía (Buenos Aires) 21 (1).
  14. Review of C. Brown, Leibniz and Strawson. A New Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. 1995. Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía (Buenos Aires) 21 (1). 
  15. 'Transparencia Mental y Tabula Rasa: la Crítica de Locke contra el Conocimiento Innato',Actas de las IV Jornadas de Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina, 1993